East-west collaboration in the European north

• Published in: International journal (Toronto) Vol. 65; no. 4; p. 837
• Main Author: Hønneland, Geir
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Toronto Sage Publications Ltd 01.10.2010
• Subjects: Best interests; Cold War; Cooperation; Democratization; Disappointment; Discourses; East and West; Economic reform; Economic theory; Environmental protection; Fisheries; Fisheries management; Foreign policy; Games; Patriotism; Political change; Quotas; Regions; Resentment; Slogans; Sustainable development; Zero sum games; Northern Europe; Russia
• ISSN: 0020-7020; 2052-465X

The winds changed towards the end of the 1990s. The Russians were no longer willing to accept any solution proposed by the west. For the Norwegians, it was particularly evident in the joint management of the fisheries. Whereas the Norwegian discourse focused on short vs. long-term interests of different types of vessels and regions, the Russian discourse saw the establishment of quotas for Barents Sea cod as a battle between the two states. Norway, it was assumed, had "instructed" its western allies in the international council to lower the Barents Sea cod quota in order to harm Russia, which was already facing an economic downturn. Norway was seen as a strictly rational actor, capable of calculating the value of its own interests precisely and minutely (because it knew exactly what its best interests were). The interests of the two states were considered to be completely at odds, and quota-setting was seen to be a zero-sum game in which one party could only win what the other party lost. According to this view, states are always seeking to destroy rivals and maximize their own chances of success. As expressed by Murmansk Oblast Governor Yuriy Yedvokimov, "It is always like this: when one state is temporarily weakened, its neighbours will try to take advantage."16 A Russian fisheries newspaper commented, "[t]here is nothing special about this - every country defends its own interest with the means available to it."'7 Or, as expressed by a Russian fisheries researcher in an interview, pinpointing the Russian perception of the quota establishment exercise as a zero-sum game, "[o]f course, it's in Norway's interest to ruin Russia. This is simple economic theory."18 The Russian discourses on marine living resources in the Barents Sea during the 1990s form part of a general Russian discourse on the country's relations with the west, what I have earlier labeUed the "Cold Peace discourse."19 The term refers to the mounting sense of disappointment in the west felt by many Russians from the early and mid-1990s, as it became increasingly clear that the political and economic reforms were not bringing the results for which many had hoped. Combined with a sense of resentment against NATO's expansion eastwards, and the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, many Russians became convinced that the cooperative attitude of the west at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was false, a way to press reforms on Russia that were bound to fail. The motive of western powers was aUegedly to weaken Russia even further while, at the same time, taking advantage of the situation to boost their own military and economic power. The process was conducted under "positive" slogans such as "democratization" and "introduction of market reforms," but many Russians came to see it as little more than a continuation of the Cold War east-west struggle.20 By the end of the decade, many had become disillusioned with the west and instead sought answers in "traditional" patriotic values. As expressed by the leader of the Murmansk regional duma commission on patriotic upbringing in 1999: