The Context of Wittgenstein's Thought: Russell, Frege and Moore

• Published in: Wittgenstein pp. 40 - 73
• Main Author: Findlay, J.N.
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: Routledge 1984
• Edition: 1
• Subjects: Frege's treatment; Begriff Und Gegenstand; Vice Versa; Grundgesetze Der Arithmetik; Mnemic Causation; Incomplete Symbols; Philosophie Der Arithmetik; simplicistic attempts; Primitive Propositions; psycho-analytic views; Objective Propositions; intentionalistic views; Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung; Logical Subject; Bertrand Russell; Wittgenstein spoke; language-oriented thought; Der Arithmetik; Logical Entities; Propositional Functions; Non-elementary Propositions; Logical Relations; Logical Constants; Propositional Unities; Misleading Suggestions; Mere Element; philosophical notations; Concept Horse; Scarecrow; Principia Mathematica; Russell's View
• ISBN: 0415382831; 9780415611060; 9780415382830; 0415611067
• DOI: 10.4324/9781315823232-3

This chapter explains doctrines of Bertrand Russell that may be reckoned to have had a great influence on Wittgenstein. It explains the teachings of Frege, whose relevance to the interpretations of Wittgenstein, and whose general philosophical importance is now fully, perhaps a little too fully, recognized. Wittgenstein spoke of all these popular works as potboilers, and thought little of them, but The Analysis of Mind had unquestionably a great influence on his later, language-oriented thought: it too teaches a doctrine of meaning as use, and has critical views, similar to Wittgenstein's later ones, of intentionalistic and psycho-analytic views of mental life. Frege's treatment of sense and reference, and have perhaps made plain that one neglect these at the peril. It is regrettable, however, that Wittgenstein never developed his insight into the necessity of alternative philosophical notations, instead of simplicistic attempts to eliminate them all, whereas in Moore alternative basic analyses remain undemolished. This chapter explains doctrines of Bertrand Russell that may be reckoned to have had a great influence on Wittgenstein. It explains the teachings of Frege, whose relevance to the interpretations of Wittgenstein, and whose general philosophical importance is now fully, perhaps a little too fully, recognized. Wittgenstein spoke of all these popular works as potboilers, and thought little of them, but The Analysis of Mind had unquestionably a great influence on his later, language-oriented thought: it too teaches a doctrine of meaning as use, and has critical views, similar to Wittgenstein's later ones, of intentionalistic and psycho-analytic views of mental life. Frege's treatment of sense and reference, and have perhaps made plain that one neglect these at the peril. It is regrettable, however, that Wittgenstein never developed his insight into the necessity of alternative philosophical notations, instead of simplicistic attempts to eliminate them all, whereas in Moore alternative basic analyses remain undemolished.