Understanding Information Disclosure from Secure Computation Output: A Study of Average Salary Computation
Secure multi-party computation has seen substantial performance improvements in recent years and is being increasingly used in commercial products. While a significant amount of work was dedicated to improving its efficiency under standard security models, the threat models do not account for inform...
        Saved in:
      
    
          | Main Authors | , , | 
|---|---|
| Format | Journal Article | 
| Language | English | 
| Published | 
          
        21.09.2022
     | 
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text | 
| DOI | 10.48550/arxiv.2209.10457 | 
Cover
| Summary: | Secure multi-party computation has seen substantial performance improvements
in recent years and is being increasingly used in commercial products. While a
significant amount of work was dedicated to improving its efficiency under
standard security models, the threat models do not account for information
leakage from the output of secure function evaluation. Quantifying information
disclosure about private inputs from observing the function outcome is the
subject of this work. Motivated by the City of Boston gender pay gap studies,
in this work we focus on the computation of the average of salaries and
quantify information disclosure about private inputs of one or more
participants (the target) to an adversary via information-theoretic techniques.
We study a number of distributions including log-normal, which is typically
used for modeling salaries. We consequently evaluate information disclosure
after repeated evaluation of the average function on overlapping inputs, as was
done in the Boston gender pay study that ran multiple times, and provide
recommendations for using the sum and average functions in secure computation
applications. Our goal is to develop mechanisms that lower information
disclosure about participants' inputs to a desired level and provide guidelines
for setting up real-world secure evaluation of this function. | 
|---|---|
| DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2209.10457 |