Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA

Standards for cryptographic protocols have long been attractive candidates for formal verification. It is important that such standards be correct, and cryptographic protocols are tricky to design and subject to non-intuitive attacks even when the underlying cryptosystems are secure. Thus a number o...

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Published inLecture notes in computer science pp. 111 - 130
Main Authors González-Burgueño, Antonio, Santiago, Sonia, Escobar, Santiago, Meadows, Catherine, Meseguer, José
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Cham Springer International Publishing 2014
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9783319140537
3319140531
ISSN0302-9743
1611-3349
1611-3349
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8

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Summary:Standards for cryptographic protocols have long been attractive candidates for formal verification. It is important that such standards be correct, and cryptographic protocols are tricky to design and subject to non-intuitive attacks even when the underlying cryptosystems are secure. Thus a number of general-purpose cryptographic protocol analysis tools have been developed and applied to protocol standards. However, there is one class of standards, security application programming interfaces (security APIs), to which few of these tools have been applied. Instead, most work has concentrated on developing special-purpose tools and algorithms for specific classes of security APIs. However, there can be much advantage gained from having general-purpose tools that could be applied to a wide class of problems, including security APIs. One particular class of APIs that has proven difficult to analyze using general-purpose tools is that involving exclusive-or. In this paper we analyze the IBM 4758 Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) protocol using an advanced automated protocol verification tool with full exclusive-or capabilities, the Maude-NPA tool. This is the first time that API protocols have been satisfactorily specified and analyzed in the Maude-NPA, and the first time XOR-based APIs have been specified and analyzed using a general-purpose unbounded session cryptographic protocol verification tool that provides direct support for AC theories. We describe our results and indicate what further research needs to be done to make such protocol analysis generally effective.
Bibliography:Antonio González-Burgueño, Sonia Santiago and Santiago Escobar have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MINECO under grants TIN 2010-21062-C02-02 and TIN 2013-45732-C4-1-P, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. José Meseguer has been partially supported by NSF Grant CNS 13-10109.
ISBN:9783319140537
3319140531
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8