THE PUZZLE OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS

The idea of "inalienability" is normally thought of as providing the strongest level of protection that a right (and hence its right-holder) can possibly enjoy. Whereas an "ordinary" fundamental right is supposed to be protected first of all against the State ("vertical"...

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Published inSingapore journal of legal studies Vol. 2; pp. 323 - 336
Main Author Pino, Giorgio
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Singapore Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 01.09.2024
Subjects
Human rights
Law
Morality
Philosophy
Political philosophy
Rights
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ISSN0218-2173

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Summary:The idea of "inalienability" is normally thought of as providing the strongest level of protection that a right (and hence its right-holder) can possibly enjoy. Whereas an "ordinary" fundamental right is supposed to be protected first of all against the State ("vertical" protection), and secondly also against other private citizens and entities in general ("horizontal" protection), some rights are supposed to be so important that they are protected, it seems, even against the choices and decisions of the very right-holder. While the idea of an inalienable right is well known in legal, moral, and political philosophy, it is not entirely clear what it means for a right to be inalienable - and whether an inalienable right is really a right after all. By using a Hohfeldian conceptual framework, this essay tries to provide an analytical inquiry into the concept of an inalienable right, and to explore under what conditions it is conceptually possible to talk of inalienable rights.
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ISSN:0218-2173