Efficient Equilibrium Concepts in Non-cooperative Network Formation

We review here some recently proposed models of non-cooperative network creation games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. Our focus is on examining the structure of stable (equilibrium) networks that correspond to efficient notions of equil...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAlgorithms, Probability, Networks, and Games Vol. 9295; pp. 384 - 395
Main Author Panagopoulou, Panagiota N.
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2015
Springer International Publishing
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Algorithms & data structures
Basic Game
Edge Swap
Equilibrium Network
Nash Equilibrium
Network hardware
Span Subgraph
User interface design & usability
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9783319240237
3319240234
ISSN0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_22

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Summary:We review here some recently proposed models of non-cooperative network creation games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. Our focus is on examining the structure of stable (equilibrium) networks that correspond to efficient notions of equilibria, in the sense that the nodes of the network are able to decide which links to add and which to remove in order to achieve a minimal cost, given the strategies of the other nodes. We also review results on the capability of the network nodes of converging into an equilibrium network by performing local selfish improvement steps.
Bibliography:This work was partially supported by the European Social Fund and Greek national funds through the research funding program Thales on “Algorithmic Game Theory” and by the EU ERC Project “ALGAME”.
ISBN:9783319240237
3319240234
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_22