Attacking Suggest Boxes in Web Applications Over HTTPS Using Side-Channel Stochastic Algorithms

Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Googl...

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Published inLecture notes in computer science Vol. 8924; pp. 116 - 130
Main Authors Schaub, Alexander, Schneider, Emmanuel, Hollender, Alexandros, Calasans, Vinicius, Jolie, Laurent, Touillon, Robin, Heuser, Annelie, Guilley, Sylvain, Rioul, Olivier
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2015
Springer International Publishing
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9783319171265
3319171267
ISSN0302-9743
1611-3349
1611-3349
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-17127-2_8

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Summary:Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Google or Bing to retrieve the client’s search query. In contrast to previous works, due to payload randomization and compression, it is not always possible to uniquely map a search query to a web traffic signature and hence stochastic algorithms must be used. They yield, for the French language, an exact recovery of search word in more than $$30$$  % of the cases. Finally, we present some methods to mitigate such side-channel leaks.
Bibliography:Original Abstract: Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Google or Bing to retrieve the client’s search query. In contrast to previous works, due to payload randomization and compression, it is not always possible to uniquely map a search query to a web traffic signature and hence stochastic algorithms must be used. They yield, for the French language, an exact recovery of search word in more than \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$30$$\end{document} % of the cases. Finally, we present some methods to mitigate such side-channel leaks.
The online demo of the attack (presented at the CRiSIS 2014 conference) is available on YouTube, at address: http://youtu.be/ynG6tuqeIuM. Annelie Heuser is Google European fellow in the field of privacy and is partially founded by this fellowship.
ISBN:9783319171265
3319171267
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-17127-2_8