Attacking Suggest Boxes in Web Applications Over HTTPS Using Side-Channel Stochastic Algorithms
Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Googl...
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| Published in | Lecture notes in computer science Vol. 8924; pp. 116 - 130 |
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| Main Authors | , , , , , , , , |
| Format | Book Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Switzerland
Springer International Publishing AG
2015
Springer International Publishing |
| Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISBN | 9783319171265 3319171267 |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 1611-3349 1611-3349 |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-319-17127-2_8 |
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| Summary: | Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Google or Bing to retrieve the client’s search query. In contrast to previous works, due to payload randomization and compression, it is not always possible to uniquely map a search query to a web traffic signature and hence stochastic algorithms must be used. They yield, for the French language, an exact recovery of search word in more than $$30$$ % of the cases. Finally, we present some methods to mitigate such side-channel leaks. |
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| Bibliography: | Original Abstract: Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Google or Bing to retrieve the client’s search query. In contrast to previous works, due to payload randomization and compression, it is not always possible to uniquely map a search query to a web traffic signature and hence stochastic algorithms must be used. They yield, for the French language, an exact recovery of search word in more than \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$30$$\end{document} % of the cases. Finally, we present some methods to mitigate such side-channel leaks. The online demo of the attack (presented at the CRiSIS 2014 conference) is available on YouTube, at address: http://youtu.be/ynG6tuqeIuM. Annelie Heuser is Google European fellow in the field of privacy and is partially founded by this fellowship. |
| ISBN: | 9783319171265 3319171267 |
| ISSN: | 0302-9743 1611-3349 1611-3349 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-17127-2_8 |