Weighted voting game based algorithm for joining a microscopic coalition
Coalition formation (CF) creates a coherent group between autonomous agents to efficiently achieve individual or collective goals. However, the idle agents are not able to maximize their utility. In this paper, the weighted voting mechanism (WVM) has been proposed that allows agents to join existing...
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| Published in | TENCON ... IEEE Region Ten Conference pp. 1 - 4 |
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| Main Authors | , , |
| Format | Conference Proceeding |
| Language | English |
| Published |
IEEE
01.10.2013
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| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISBN | 9781479928255 1479928259 |
| ISSN | 2159-3442 |
| DOI | 10.1109/TENCON.2013.6718491 |
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| Summary: | Coalition formation (CF) creates a coherent group between autonomous agents to efficiently achieve individual or collective goals. However, the idle agents are not able to maximize their utility. In this paper, the weighted voting mechanism (WVM) has been proposed that allows agents to join existing coalitions. The experiments endorsed agents' number and the trust element as parameters to study the voting result percentage. The simulation of the WVM shows the complete voting session percentage which is a measurement of agents' voting efficiency has been reduced to 26.4% in a society of 500 agents. Utilizing the WVM, the voting session of the coalition in deciding agents' joining coalition request (JCR) can be reduced and increase the efficiency of the decision making. |
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| ISBN: | 9781479928255 1479928259 |
| ISSN: | 2159-3442 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/TENCON.2013.6718491 |