A graph-theoretical characterization of power network vulnerabilities

This work is concerned with the security of a power network against components failure and external attacks. We model a power plant as a linear continuous-time descriptor system. We adopt the framework of structural control theory, and we associate a digraph with the power plant. We provide a necess...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inProceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference pp. 3918 - 3923
Main Authors Pasqualetti, Fabio, Bicchi, Antonio, Bullo, Francesco
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published IEEE 01.06.2011
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ISBN1457700808
9781457700804
ISSN0743-1619
DOI10.1109/ACC.2011.5991344

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Summary:This work is concerned with the security of a power network against components failure and external attacks. We model a power plant as a linear continuous-time descriptor system. We adopt the framework of structural control theory, and we associate a digraph with the power plant. We provide a necessary and sufficient graph theoretic condition for the existence of vulnerabilities that are inherent to the power network interconnection structure. From a system theoretic perspective, we generalize a known result on the structural rank of the transfer matrix of a state space system to take into account a set of algebraic constraints.
ISBN:1457700808
9781457700804
ISSN:0743-1619
DOI:10.1109/ACC.2011.5991344