Optimal Biosecurity Policywith Heterogeneous Farmers

Infectious animal diseases raise serious challenges for both public health and the livestocksector. We develop an original principal-multiple agent model for preventing these diseases thatexplicitly considers the heterogeneity of risk-averse farmers in addition to production externalitiesandex antei...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of agricultural and resource economics Vol. 47; no. 2
Main Authors Osseni, Abdel Fawaz, Gohin, Alexandre, Rault, Arnaud
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.05.2022
Subjects
Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
Incentive program
Population-based instruments
Individual-based instruments
Public policy
Public good
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ISSN1068-5502
DOI10.22004/ag.econ.311029

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Summary:Infectious animal diseases raise serious challenges for both public health and the livestocksector. We develop an original principal-multiple agent model for preventing these diseases thatexplicitly considers the heterogeneity of risk-averse farmers in addition to production externalitiesandex anteinformational asymmetries. Our results confirm that failing to consider farmers'heterogeneity generates Pareto-inefficient solutions. When using individual-based instruments,the government should cope with heterogeneity by increasing guaranteed payments and reducingaverage payments. However, when population-based instruments are the only available policytools, increasing average payments is better for reducing moral hazard issues.
ISSN:1068-5502
DOI:10.22004/ag.econ.311029