INDEPENDENCE, CONGRESSIONAL WEAKNESS, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF APPOINTMENT: THE IMPACT OF COMBINING BUDGETARY AUTONOMY WITH REMOVAL PROTECTION

• Published in: Harvard law review Vol. 125; no. 7; pp. 1822 - 1843
• Main Author: Harvard Law Review
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge Harvard Law Review Association 01.05.2012
• Subjects: Administrative agencies; Appropriations; Appropriations legislation; Autonomy; Budget; Budget appropriations; Budget cuts; Budgetary control; Case studies; Control; Decision making; Dismissal of; Economic planning; Economic policy; Employees; Evaluation; Executive power; Expenditures, Public; Federal budgets; Federal Reserve Bank; Federalism; Financial independence; Funding; Government agencies; HISTORY; Independence; Independent regulatory commissions; Laws, regulations and rules; Legislative power; MONEY; NEGOTIATION; Officials and employees; Political appointments; Political behaviour; Politics; Public sector; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE; Selection and appointment; Strength; U.S.A; United States federal budget; United States Senate; United States. Securities and Exchange Commission; Veto; UNITED STATES; United States > US
• ISSN: 0017-811X; 2161-976X

The influence of appropriations on independent agencies has long been overshadowed by the traditional focus on the consequences of removal restrictions. The very definition of an independent agency is an agency with a head or board that the President can remove only for cause. Constitutional and normative evaluations have also focused on the impact of limiting removal. Similarly, the Supreme Court's analysis of independent agencies has focused on the constitutionality of removal restrictions.