Experiments on Stable Suboptimality in Individual Behavior

In several recent experiments, subjects behaved irrationally, and their irrationality appeared to be systematic and motivated. The subjects worked for money by repeatedly choosing one of 2 alternatives in procedures in which the long-run pattern of choice interacted with the rate of payment for each...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe American economic review Vol. 81; no. 2; pp. 360 - 364
Main Author Herrnstein, R. J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Menasha, Wis American Economic Association 01.05.1991
American Economic Assoc
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ISSN0002-8282
1944-7981

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Summary:In several recent experiments, subjects behaved irrationally, and their irrationality appeared to be systematic and motivated. The subjects worked for money by repeatedly choosing one of 2 alternatives in procedures in which the long-run pattern of choice interacted with the rate of payment for each alternative. They earned less money than they could have, and there was no plausible compensating nonmonetary gain. Melioration rather than maximization appears to have driven the subjects' choices in 2 experiments that did not pit melioration against maximization in a way that would decisively affect earnings. In a 3rd experiment, melioration implied the maximally inefficient allocation of choices. A large majority of subjects learned the least efficient strategy, and obeying the principle of melioration was relatively expensive. The evidence points toward generically suboptimal human choice under at least some conditions.
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ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981