On some aspects of the organization of state control and supervision in the USA
The article is dedicated to studying the specifics of the organization of oversight and control activities in the United States and identifying the potential for utilizing the most effective aspects of the American experience in this field to improve state control and oversight in the Russian Federa...
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Published in | Право и политика no. 7; pp. 99 - 122 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
01.07.2025
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Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 2454-0706 2454-0706 |
DOI | 10.7256/2454-0706.2025.7.75280 |
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Summary: | The article is dedicated to studying the specifics of the organization of oversight and control activities in the United States and identifying the potential for utilizing the most effective aspects of the American experience in this field to improve state control and oversight in the Russian Federation. The aim of the research is to define certain characteristics of the system of oversight bodies in the U.S. that affect its efficiency and to assess their applicability for enhancing the work of similar bodies in Russia. The main focus is on examining the organization of the work of the Offices of Inspectors General (OIG) operating in federal executive departments, independent federal agencies, commissions, as well as government-funded enterprises. Attention is given to issues related to the interaction of OIGs with corporate whistleblowers, exploring the legal mechanisms for their protection and incentives. The key method used in the research is the comparative legal analysis method, which, through the application of the entire set of formal-logical methods, conducts a comparative analysis of foreign and Russian legislation and draws conclusions about the applicability of certain practices for the improvement of the oversight and control system in the Russian Federation. Based on the research conducted, the author concludes that for Russia, the study and adaptation of the experience of this country is of interest, primarily because both the Russian Federation and the United States face the necessity of managing oversight in the context of significant geographical and climatic differences between regions, and despite differences in political and economic systems, share many similar institutional problems. A conclusion is formulated regarding the possibility of utilizing certain aspects of the positive experience of the U.S. for the system of oversight bodies in the Russian Federation, taking into account adaptation to domestic practices. In particular, a proposal is made for the creation of independent specialized oversight bodies similar to OIGs, as well as the importance of improving the legislative framework in the field of protection and incentive for corporate informants. |
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ISSN: | 2454-0706 2454-0706 |
DOI: | 10.7256/2454-0706.2025.7.75280 |