林农合作组织与成员合作行为的演化博弈分析

“民办、民管、民受益”是林农合作组织的组织原则，但民主管理在一些农民合作组织中却并未落到实处。从组织管理的角度，利用演化博弈论中的复制动态模型，对林农合作组织与成员的行为规律及影响他们决策的主要因素进行了分析。结果表明：林农合作组织与成员的决策受到对方行为策略、自身行为的预期收益和成本的共同影响。根据研究结果，提出促进林农合作组织民主管理的对策。...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in广东农业科学 Vol. 39; no. 11; pp. 215 - 218
Main Author 顾艳红 张大红
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
Published 北京林业大学理学院,北京100083 2012
北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083%北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京,100083
Subjects
收益
林农合作组织
演化博弈论
监督成本
收益
监督成本
林农合作组织
演化博弈论
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ISSN1004-874X
DOI10.3969/j.issn.1004-874X.2012.11.069

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Summary:“民办、民管、民受益”是林农合作组织的组织原则，但民主管理在一些农民合作组织中却并未落到实处。从组织管理的角度，利用演化博弈论中的复制动态模型，对林农合作组织与成员的行为规律及影响他们决策的主要因素进行了分析。结果表明：林农合作组织与成员的决策受到对方行为策略、自身行为的预期收益和成本的共同影响。根据研究结果，提出促进林农合作组织民主管理的对策。
Bibliography:44-1267/S
forest farmer cooperative ; lucre ; supervision cost ; evolutionary game theory
Founded by farmers, supervised by farmers and avail to farmers＂ is the fundamental of forest farmer cooperative. However, democracy management does not put into practice in some forest farmer cooperative. From the aspect of management, a replication dynamic model of the relationship between the supervisors and the members with some parameters is constructed to investigate the potential factors which influence their behavior. Based on the replication dynamic model, it shows that the supervisors and the members＇ behavior are influenced by the opponent＇s strategy, the expectant benefit and the cost for their behavior. As a result, some suggestions are proposed to protect the farmers＇ profit and impel the forest farmer cooperative develop steadily and healthily.
GU Yan-hong, ZHANG Da-hong2 （1. College of Science, Beijing Forestry University,Beijing 100083, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry Universit
ISSN:1004-874X
DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1004-874X.2012.11.069