The firm strikes back Non-compete agreements and the mobility of technical professionals

• Published in: American sociological review Vol. 76; no. 5; pp. 695 - 712
• Main Author: Marx, Matt
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Los Angeles, CA Sage Publications 01.10.2011; SAGE Publications; American Sociological Association
• Subjects: Ability; Advantages; Agreements; Arbeitnehmer; Arbeitsmobilität; Arbeitsplatzwechsel; Arbeitsverhältnis; Arbeitsvertrag; Beschränkung; Business; Business structures; Career development; Careers; Companies; Competition; Contracts; Dyadic relations; Employees; Employment; Employment contracts; Employment interviews; Engineers; Enterprises; Expertise; Hoch Qualifizierter; Human capital; Industrial market; Industry; Investments; Knowledge; Knowledge Economy; Kündigung; Kündigungsabsicht; Labor Force; Labor Market; Labor markets; Labour contract; Litigation; Markets; Mobility; Mobilitätsbereitschaft; Noncompetition agreements; Occupational mobility; Professionals; Saxenian, AnnaLee; Secrets; Semiotics; Skilled labor; Skilled workers; Social organization; Social Organizations; Sociology; Sociology of Work; Sociology of work and sociology of organizations; Strikes; Studies; Technical personnel; Trade secrets; Treuepflicht; Unternehmensführung; USA; Wage differential; Wettbewerb; Work; Work organization; Work organization. Working relations; Workers; Workforce; United States Of America; United States > US; New York; Silicon Valley-California; mobility; employment contracts; externalized labor markets; internal labor markets; Industry; Labor Market; Survey; Technician; Enterprise; Mobility; Professional career; Employment contract; Social Organization
• ISSN: 0003-1224; 1939-8271
• DOI: 10.1177/0003122411414822

"This study explores how firms shape labor markets and career paths using employee non-compete agreements. The sociology of work has overlooked non-competes, but data indicate that nearly half of technical professionals in the United States are asked to sign such employment contracts. Fearing loss of investments in talent and trade secrets, firms use non-competes to 'strike back' against technical professionals' increased mobility following the decline of internal labor markets. In-depth interviews with 52 randomly sampled patent holders in a single industry, coupled with a survey of 1,029 engineers across a variety of industries, reveal that ex-employees subject to non-competes are more likely to take career detours -- that is, they involuntarily leave their technical field to avoid a potential lawsuit. Moreover, firms strategically manage the process of getting workers to sign such contracts, waiting for workers' bargaining position to weaken. These findings inform our understanding of the social organization of work in the knowledge economy." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku). Die Untersuchung enthält quantitative Daten. Forschungsmethode: empirisch; Befragung.