Incentive systems in a real effort experiment

In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects. Payments based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean economic review Vol. 45; no. 2; pp. 187 - 214
Main Authors van Dijk, Frans, Sonnemans, Joep, van Winden, Frans
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.02.2001
Elsevier
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
SeriesEuropean Economic Review
Subjects
Computerization
Cooperation
Earnings
Economic incentives
Economic models
Economic theory
Experiment
Experiments
Hypotheses
Mathematical economics
Pay-off
Payment schemes
Payments
Productivity incentives
Statistics
Studies
Task performance
Teams
Teamwork
Tournaments
Workers
J3
J33
Payment schemes
Experiment
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00056-8

Cover

More Information
Summary:In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects. Payments based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels. In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others. Finally, attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions.
Bibliography:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI:10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00056-8