Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason

The ever-increasing application of algorithms to decision-making in a range of social contexts has prompted demands for algorithmic accountability. Accountable decision-makers must provide their decision-subjects with justifications for their automated system’s outputs, but what kinds of broader pri...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophy & technology Vol. 31; no. 4; pp. 543 - 556
Main Author Binns, Reuben
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.12.2018
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN2210-5433
2210-5441
2210-5441
DOI10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5

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Summary:The ever-increasing application of algorithms to decision-making in a range of social contexts has prompted demands for algorithmic accountability. Accountable decision-makers must provide their decision-subjects with justifications for their automated system’s outputs, but what kinds of broader principles should we expect such justifications to appeal to? Drawing from political philosophy, I present an account of algorithmic accountability in terms of the democratic ideal of ‘public reason’. I argue that situating demands for algorithmic accountability within this justificatory framework enables us to better articulate their purpose and assess the adequacy of efforts toward them.
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ISSN:2210-5433
2210-5441
2210-5441
DOI:10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5