Subjective probabilities and scoring rules: experimental evidence

This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAmerican journal of agricultural economics Vol. 71; no. 2; pp. 363 - 369
Main Authors Nelson, R.G. (Sam Houston State University), Bessler, D.A
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Menasha, Wis Oxford University Press 01.05.1989
American Agricultural Economics Association
Blackwell
American Farm Economic Association
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Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0002-9092
1467-8276
DOI10.2307/1241594

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Summary:This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects in a probability forecasting experiment. Results suggest that theory holds when subjects forecast over many periods, although inexperienced subjects may fail to exploit the dominant strategy in the initial periods.
Bibliography:E10
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ISSN:0002-9092
1467-8276
DOI:10.2307/1241594