Subjective probabilities and scoring rules: experimental evidence
This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects i...
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Published in | American journal of agricultural economics Vol. 71; no. 2; pp. 363 - 369 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Menasha, Wis
Oxford University Press
01.05.1989
American Agricultural Economics Association Blackwell American Farm Economic Association |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0002-9092 1467-8276 |
DOI | 10.2307/1241594 |
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Summary: | This paper provides an articulation of the theory of scoring rules that leads to a testable hypothesis about strategic behavior under an improper rule. Subjects in a laboratory setting were first screened for linear utility in the range of rewards. Those that passed this test were used as subjects in a probability forecasting experiment. Results suggest that theory holds when subjects forecast over many periods, although inexperienced subjects may fail to exploit the dominant strategy in the initial periods. |
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Bibliography: | E10 9004176 istex:ABC7D05ED4B3BB49D83C5673F596122E9B80C996 ark:/67375/HXZ-NTC4ST8F-Z ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0002-9092 1467-8276 |
DOI: | 10.2307/1241594 |