The Measure of Knowledge

Regardless of whether one knows more than one did when one was a child, there is at least something it would be for this claim to be true. Treanor examines what this would be.

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNoûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 577 - 601
Main Author Treanor, Nick
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2013
Wiley Blackwell
Wiley-Blackwell
Subjects
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Knowledge
Philosophy
Knowledge theory
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00854.x

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Summary:Regardless of whether one knows more than one did when one was a child, there is at least something it would be for this claim to be true. Treanor examines what this would be.
Bibliography:ArticleID:NOUS854
ark:/67375/WNG-03XRDM2F-0
Versions of this work have been presented at the Freie Universität Amsterdam, the 2009 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, the University of Geneva, a meeting of the UK Mind Network, and at the Serious Metaphysics Group, and a faculty colloquium, at Cambridge. I have benefited on each occasion from the discussion and thank in particular Don Fallis and Joshue Orozco, who commented at Bellingham, and Frank Jackson, who commented at the faculty colloquium. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal, to Duncan Pritchard and the University of Edinburgh for hosting me as a visitor while I worked on this paper, and to the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities at Cambridge for an early career fellowship that provided me leave to finish it.
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ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00854.x