The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models

In costly voting models, voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the benefit from voting. In probabilistic voting models, they always vote for a candidate who generates the highest utility, which is subject to random shocks. We prove an equivalence result: In two-candidate elections,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 80; pp. 179 - 185
Main Authors Kamada, Yuichiro, Kojima, Fuhito
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Duluth Elsevier Inc 01.07.2013
Elsevier
Academic Press
Subjects
Candidates
Costly voting
Elections
Electoral competition
Equivalence
Probabilistic voting
Probability
Robustness
Stochastic models
Studies
Utility measurement
Voting
Voting behaviour
Costly voting
Probabilistic voting
Equivalence
D72
Electoral competition
C72
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.001

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Summary:In costly voting models, voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the benefit from voting. In probabilistic voting models, they always vote for a candidate who generates the highest utility, which is subject to random shocks. We prove an equivalence result: In two-candidate elections, given any costly voting model, there exists a probabilistic voting model that generates winning probabilities identical to those in the former model for any policy announcements, and vice versa. Thus many predictions of interest established in one of the models hold in the other as well, providing robustness of the conclusions to model specifications.
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ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.001