Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence From Nepal and the DRC

Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of intervention and statebuilding Vol. 13; no. 1; pp. 112 - 130
Main Authors Ansorg, Nadine, Strasheim, Julia
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 01.01.2019
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Arms control & disarmament
Case studies
Conflict
DDR
DRC
Game theory
Konflikt
Nepal
Post-conflict societies
Program implementation
Rehabilitation
veto player theory
Veto-Spieler
Veto-Spieler Theorie
Vetoes
Nepal
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1750-2977
1750-2985
1750-2985
DOI10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981

Cover

More Information
Summary:Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1750-2977
1750-2985
1750-2985
DOI:10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981