The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya

The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its applicati...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of strategic studies Vol. 34; no. 5; pp. 647 - 680
Main Author Miakinkov, Eugene
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 01.10.2011
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Armed conflict
Armed Forces
Asymmetry
Chechnya
Conflict
Conflict theory
Counterinsurgency
Military
Military policy
Military strategy
Public Policy
Rebellions
Russia
Strategic management
War
Warfare
Chechnya Russia
Russia
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0140-2390
1743-937X
DOI10.1080/01402390.2011.608946

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Summary:The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its application is theoretically feasible. This hypothesis will be tested against the backdrop of the conflict in Chechnya. The work will examine the Russian military and public policy as a subordinate subject to the overall inquiry of the article in an attempt to show that force was one of the major factors behind Russian military success in 2001.
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ISSN:0140-2390
1743-937X
DOI:10.1080/01402390.2011.608946