Mental Causation for Standard Dualists

The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our behaviour is physically necessitated by entirely physical phenomena, there appears to be no room for duali...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAustralasian journal of philosophy Vol. 102; no. 4; pp. 978 - 998
Main Author Vaassen, Bram
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Routledge 01.10.2024
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Causal Exclusion
Consciousness
Dualism
Higher-Level Causation
Mental Causation
teoretisk filosofi
Theoretical Philosophy
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0004-8402
1471-6828
1471-6828
DOI10.1080/00048402.2024.2335325

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Summary:The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our behaviour is physically necessitated by entirely physical phenomena, there appears to be no room for dualist mental causation. Some argue that dualists can address this problem by making minimal adjustments in their ontology. I argue that no such adjustments are required. Given recent developments in philosophy of causation, it is plausible that mental phenomena cause behaviour in standard dualist ontologies.
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ISSN:0004-8402
1471-6828
1471-6828
DOI:10.1080/00048402.2024.2335325