An Efficient Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for Roaming Vehicle

• Published in: IEEE access Vol. 11; p. 1
• Main Authors: Yadav, Kirti A., Vijayakumar, P
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Piscataway IEEE 01.01.2023; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Authentication; Communication; communication cost; computation cost; Cost analysis; Home automation; intelligent transport system(ITS); Intelligent transportation systems; Intelligent vehicles; Lightweight; privacy preservation; Protocols; Roadsides; Roaming; Scalability; Security; signature; Trust management; trusted authority; Vehicles; Vehicular ad hoc networks; vehicular adhoc network
• ISSN: 2169-3536; 2169-3536
• DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3276822

Intelligent vehicles and their infrastructure have been booming topic that needs attention towards grooming security services and providing a safe-secure drive experience to users worldwide. Authentication of these vehicles within the and away from the home network plays an essential role in maintaining seamless service access, especially for a user moving away from the home network. Traditional schemes are centralized and primarily focus on vehicle authentication within a home network. Significantly less work has been conducted on vehicle authentication during roaming. The trusted authority (TA) has to authenticate its vehicle along with the one in roaming, which increases the communication and computational load on the TA as scalability increases. This article presents a lightweight authentication scheme, especially for vehicles that are in roaming and focuses on sharing the authentication load. A vehicle, along with its home TA (HTA) identity, sends an authentication request to the nearby roadside unit (RSU) during roaming. The foreign TA (FTA), after receiving the authentication request from the RSU, connects with the HTA. Vehicle authenticity is confirmed as a session key generated for communication with the roaming vehicle, ensuring seamless service access. The proposed scheme is tested against standard BAN logic to prove that it meets the required security standards and authentication requirements. Furthermore, the communication and computation cost analysis proves that this scheme is lightweight compared to other traditional schemes. Security analysis proves that the proposed scheme can successfully prevent major attacks, such as anonymity, unlinkability, replay attack, message tampering, and malicious vehicle tracking.