Physical Limitation of Range-Domain Secrecy Using Frequency Diverse Arrays

• Published in: IEEE access Vol. 8; pp. 63302 - 63309
• Main Authors: Ding, Yuan, Narbudowicz, Adam, Goussetis, George
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Piscataway IEEE 2020; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: 1/f noise; Array signal processing; Arrays; Communication system security; Directional modulation; Domains; Eavesdropping; frequency diverse array (FDA); Frequency diversity; Germanium; Magnetic domains; physical-layer wireless security; radiation patterns; Security; Waveforms
• ISSN: 2169-3536; 2169-3536
• DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2984643

In this paper, the concept and recent development of exploiting frequency diverse array (FDA) and its variants for the physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully examined. Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative simulations, the authors realize that the investigations performed in some recent works overlooked one critical issue facing the real-world applications, and system models established and used before were based on a limited assumption, i.e. that the legitimate and eavesdropping users at different ranges sample the signal waveforms at the same time instant. The limitation of this assumption results in their studies inconclusive. The authors aim to take the first step to divert research efforts and rectify the previous incomplete analyses. The authors argue that in the current technology base the FDA cannot secure a free-space wireless transmission in range domain, because the previously claimed `secure reception region' propagates in range domain as time elapses.