Promoting socially desirable behaviors through persuasion and commitment: Experimental evidence
Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the...
Saved in:
Published in | Journal of behavioral and experimental economics Vol. 101; p. 101931 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article Web Resource |
Language | English |
Published |
Elsevier Inc
01.12.2022
|
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 2214-8043 2214-8051 2214-8051 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101931 |
Cover
Summary: | Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the same game in which we successively introduce a persuasion message, commitment devices, and communication between subjects. Our results suggest that these non-monetary procedures significantly increase cooperation and reduce the decay of contributions across periods. |
---|---|
Bibliography: | scopus-id:2-s2.0-85138817515 |
ISSN: | 2214-8043 2214-8051 2214-8051 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101931 |