Promoting socially desirable behaviors through persuasion and commitment: Experimental evidence

Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of behavioral and experimental economics Vol. 101; p. 101931
Main Authors Bazart, Cécile, Lefebvre, Mathieu, Rosaz, Julie
Format Journal Article Web Resource
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Inc 01.12.2022
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ISSN2214-8043
2214-8051
2214-8051
DOI10.1016/j.socec.2022.101931

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Summary:Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the same game in which we successively introduce a persuasion message, commitment devices, and communication between subjects. Our results suggest that these non-monetary procedures significantly increase cooperation and reduce the decay of contributions across periods.
Bibliography:scopus-id:2-s2.0-85138817515
ISSN:2214-8043
2214-8051
2214-8051
DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2022.101931