Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party which represents the health insu...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational journal of environmental research and public health Vol. 17; no. 15; p. 5540
Main Authors Reif, Simon, Hafner, Lucas, Seebauer, Michael
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Basel MDPI AG 31.07.2020
MDPI
Subjects
Behavior
Dictators
Experiments
Health care
Influence
Laboratories
Medical research
Patients
Physicians
Students
Third party
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1660-4601
1661-7827
1660-4601
DOI10.3390/ijerph17155540

Cover

More Information
Summary:Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party which represents the health insurance that finances medical service provision under a prospective payment scheme. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical care. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as in medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly and are more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
content type line 23
ISSN:1660-4601
1661-7827
1660-4601
DOI:10.3390/ijerph17155540