Breakdown of utilitarian moral judgement after basolateral amygdala damage

Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a m...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 119; no. 31; pp. 1 - 7
Main Authors van Honk, Jack, Terburg, David, Montoya, Estrella R., Grafman, Jordan, Stein, Dan J., Morgan, Barak
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States National Academy of Sciences 02.08.2022
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0027-8424
1091-6490
1091-6490
DOI10.1073/pnas.2119072119

Cover

More Information
Summary:Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a model-free algorithm that emphasizes the intrinsic value of the sacrificial action, while utilitarian (sacrificial) moral judgments are derived from a model-based algorithm that emphasizes the outcome of the sacrificial action. Rodent decision-making research suggests that the model-based algorithm depends on the basolateral amygdala (BLA), but these findings have not yet been translated to human moral decision-making. Here, in five humans with selective, bilateral BLA damage, we show a breakdown of utilitarian sacrificial moral judgments, pointing at deficient model-based moral decision-making. Across an established set of moral dilemmas, healthy controls frequently sacrifice one person to save numerous others, but BLA-damaged humans withhold such sacrificial judgments even at the cost of thousands of lives. Our translational research confirms a neurocomputational hypothesis drawn from rodent decision-making research by indicating that the model-based algorithm which underlies outcome-based, utilitarian moral judgements in humans critically depends on the BLA.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
content type line 23
2J.V.H. and D.T. contributed equally to this work.
Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University, Durham, NC; received October 19, 2021; accepted June 7, 2022 by Editorial Board Member Michael S. Gazzaniga
Author contributions: J.V.H. designed research; J.V.H. and B.M. performed research; D.T., E.R.M., and D.J.S. analyzed data; and J.V.H., D.T., E.R.M., J.G., D.J.S., and B.M. wrote the paper.
ISSN:0027-8424
1091-6490
1091-6490
DOI:10.1073/pnas.2119072119