Breakdown of utilitarian moral judgement after basolateral amygdala damage
Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a m...
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          | Published in | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS Vol. 119; no. 31; pp. 1 - 7 | 
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| Main Authors | , , , , , | 
| Format | Journal Article | 
| Language | English | 
| Published | 
        United States
          National Academy of Sciences
    
        02.08.2022
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| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text | 
| ISSN | 0027-8424 1091-6490 1091-6490  | 
| DOI | 10.1073/pnas.2119072119 | 
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| Summary: | Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a model-free algorithm that emphasizes the intrinsic value of the sacrificial action, while utilitarian (sacrificial) moral judgments are derived from a model-based algorithm that emphasizes the outcome of the sacrificial action. Rodent decision-making research suggests that the model-based algorithm depends on the basolateral amygdala (BLA), but these findings have not yet been translated to human moral decision-making. Here, in five humans with selective, bilateral BLA damage, we show a breakdown of utilitarian sacrificial moral judgments, pointing at deficient model-based moral decision-making. Across an established set of moral dilemmas, healthy controls frequently sacrifice one person to save numerous others, but BLA-damaged humans withhold such sacrificial judgments even at the cost of thousands of lives. Our translational research confirms a neurocomputational hypothesis drawn from rodent decision-making research by indicating that the model-based algorithm which underlies outcome-based, utilitarian moral judgements in humans critically depends on the BLA. | 
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23 2J.V.H. and D.T. contributed equally to this work. Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University, Durham, NC; received October 19, 2021; accepted June 7, 2022 by Editorial Board Member Michael S. Gazzaniga Author contributions: J.V.H. designed research; J.V.H. and B.M. performed research; D.T., E.R.M., and D.J.S. analyzed data; and J.V.H., D.T., E.R.M., J.G., D.J.S., and B.M. wrote the paper.  | 
| ISSN: | 0027-8424 1091-6490 1091-6490  | 
| DOI: | 10.1073/pnas.2119072119 |