Logical Concepts and Logical Inferences

Some philosophers find the following thesis attractive: for every logical constant C there is a set of logical rules of inference R such that a subject knows the meaning of C if and only if she accepts the rules in R. I point out some obvious but, apparently, easily forgotten difficulties concerning...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inDialectica Vol. 58; no. 3; pp. 395 - 411
Main Author Casalegno, Paolo
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2004
Blackwell-Wiley Publishing
Subjects
A priori knowledge
Inductive reasoning
Inference
Logic
Logical constants
Logical disjunction
Modus ponens
Reasoning
Rules of inference
Syllogisms
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0012-2017
1746-8361
DOI10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00313.x

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Summary:Some philosophers find the following thesis attractive: for every logical constant C there is a set of logical rules of inference R such that a subject knows the meaning of C if and only if she accepts the rules in R. I point out some obvious but, apparently, easily forgotten difficulties concerning this thesis.
Bibliography:ArticleID:DLTC395
istex:C762692B50F04AF1CD847EE39859A79063830E08
ark:/67375/WNG-73R1DD4C-4
ISSN:0012-2017
1746-8361
DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00313.x