Feedback Nash Equilibrium for Randomly Switching Differential-Algebraic Games
As a subclass of stochastic differential games with algebraic constraints, this article studies dynamic noncooperative games where the dynamics are described by Markov jump differential-algebraic equations (DAEs). Theoretical tools, which require computing the extended generator and deriving Hamilto...
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| Published in | IEEE transactions on automatic control Vol. 65; no. 8; pp. 3286 - 3301 |
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| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
New York
IEEE
01.08.2020
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISSN | 0018-9286 1558-2523 2334-3303 1558-2523 |
| DOI | 10.1109/TAC.2019.2943577 |
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| Summary: | As a subclass of stochastic differential games with algebraic constraints, this article studies dynamic noncooperative games where the dynamics are described by Markov jump differential-algebraic equations (DAEs). Theoretical tools, which require computing the extended generator and deriving Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for Markov jump DAEs, are developed. These fundamental results lead to pure feedback optimal strategies to compute the Nash equilibrium in noncooperative setting. In case of quadratic cost and linear dynamics, these strategies are obtained by solving coupled Riccati-like differential equations. Under an appropriate stabilizability assumption on system dynamics, these differential equations reduce to coupled algebraic Riccati equations when the cost functionals are considered over infinite horizon. As a first case-study, the application of our results is studied in the context of an economic system where different suppliers aim to maximize their profits subject to the market demands and fluctuations in operating conditions. The second case-study refers to the conventional problem of robust control for randomly switching linear DAEs, which can be formulated as a two-player zero sum game and is solved using the results developed in this article. |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 0018-9286 1558-2523 2334-3303 1558-2523 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/TAC.2019.2943577 |