Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence

• Published in: Games and economic behavior Vol. 141; pp. 30 - 51
• Main Authors: Lauber, Arne, March, Christoph, Sahm, Marco
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.09.2023
• Subjects: All-pay auction; Experiment; Fairness; Intensity; Sequential round-robin tournament; Strategic momentum; Intensity; Experiment; Strategic momentum; Z20; C91; All-pay auction; Sequential round-robin tournament; D72; Fairness; C72
• ISSN: 0899-8256; 1090-2473
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011

We experimentally investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum.