Sincere voting in large elections

Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere/informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alter...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGames and economic behavior Vol. 101; pp. 121 - 131
Main Authors Acharya, Avidit, Meirowitz, Adam
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Inc 01.01.2017
Subjects
Informative voting
Sincere voting
Strategic voting
Sincere voting
Informative voting
Strategic voting
C72
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010

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Summary:Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere/informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter—one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives—as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a “no evidence type.” The expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small; nevertheless, if the electorate is large enough, then each of the two standard Condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type-symmetric equilibrium.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010