On the Structural Stability of Values for Cooperative Games
It is generally assumed that any set of players can form a feasible coalition for classical cooperative games. But, in fact, some players may withdraw from the current game and form a union, if this makes them better paid than proposed. Based on the principle of coalition split, this paper presents...
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| Published in | Journal of optimization theory and applications Vol. 189; no. 3; pp. 873 - 888 |
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| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
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New York
Springer US
01.06.2021
Springer Nature B.V |
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| ISSN | 0022-3239 1573-2878 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10957-021-01863-6 |
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| Abstract | It is generally assumed that any set of players can form a feasible coalition for classical cooperative games. But, in fact, some players may withdraw from the current game and form a union, if this makes them better paid than proposed. Based on the principle of coalition split, this paper presents an endogenous procedure of coalition formation by levels and bargaining for payoffs simultaneously, where the unions formed in the previous step continue to negotiate with others in the next step as “individuals,” looking for maximum share of surplus by organizing themselves as a partition. The structural stability of the induced payoff configuration is discussed, using two stability criteria of core notion for cooperative games and strong equilibrium notion for noncooperative games. |
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| AbstractList | It is generally assumed that any set of players can form a feasible coalition for classical cooperative games. But, in fact, some players may withdraw from the current game and form a union, if this makes them better paid than proposed. Based on the principle of coalition split, this paper presents an endogenous procedure of coalition formation by levels and bargaining for payoffs simultaneously, where the unions formed in the previous step continue to negotiate with others in the next step as “individuals,” looking for maximum share of surplus by organizing themselves as a partition. The structural stability of the induced payoff configuration is discussed, using two stability criteria of core notion for cooperative games and strong equilibrium notion for noncooperative games. |
| Author | Li, Xianghui Li, Yang |
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| Cites_doi | 10.1007/s00182-018-0631-0 10.1287/moor.2.3.225 10.1007/s10726-018-9570-1 10.1007/BF01258278 10.1142/S0219198910002593 10.1007/BF01766876 10.1007/BF01268161 10.1007/s00182-017-0572-z 10.2307/1912051 10.1142/S0219198907001412 10.1007/BF01719767 10.1007/BF01253780 |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s10957-021-01863-6 |
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| Keywords | 91A12 05C65 Level structure 91A43 Stability Coalition formation Strong equilibrium |
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| SubjectTerms | Applications of Mathematics Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control; Optimization Cooperation Engineering Equilibrium Game theory Games Graphs Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Operations Research/Decision Theory Optimization Stability criteria Structural stability Theory of Computation |
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| Title | On the Structural Stability of Values for Cooperative Games |
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