The Puzzle of Belief

The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inCognitive science Vol. 47; no. 2; pp. e13245 - n/a
Main Authors Van Leeuwen, Neil, Lombrozo, Tania
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published United States Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01.02.2023
Subjects
Attitudes
Belief
Beliefs
Cognitive ability
Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Science
Cultural Diversity
Dissent and Disputes
Epistemology
Humans
Knowledge
Belief
Epistemology
Attitudes
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0364-0213
1551-6709
1551-6709
DOI10.1111/cogs.13245

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Summary:The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi‐dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes “belief.”
Bibliography:This article is part of the “Progress & Puzzles of Cognitive Science” letter series.
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ObjectType-Editorial-2
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ISSN:0364-0213
1551-6709
1551-6709
DOI:10.1111/cogs.13245