Measuring preferences for algorithms — How willing are people to cede control to algorithms?

• Published in: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics Vol. 112; p. 102270
• Main Authors: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, Tolksdorf, Michel
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.10.2024
• Subjects: Algorithm aversion; Delegation; Experiment; Preferences; Algorithm aversion; Experiment; C91; Preferences; D91; D83; Delegation
• ISSN: 2214-8043; 2214-8051
• DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102270

We suggest a simple method to elicit individual preferences for algorithms. By altering the monetary incentives for ceding control to the algorithm, the menu-based approach allows for measuring in particular the degree of algorithm aversion. Using an experiment, we elicit preferences for algorithms in an environment with measurable performance accuracy under two conditions — the absence and the presence of information about the algorithm’s performance. Providing such information raises subjects’ willingness to rely on algorithms when ceding control to the algorithm is more costly than trusting in their own assessment. However, algorithms are still underutilized. •Suggest a simple method for elicitation of individual preferences for algorithms.•The menu-based approach allows measuring the degree of algorithm aversion.•Feedback on algorithm performance positively affects the delegation to algorithms.