Civic engagement, the leverage effect and the accountable state
A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need for voluntary collective action remains, however, because binding the state to citizen's interests requires the...
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| Published in | European economic review Vol. 156; p. 104466 |
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| Main Authors | , , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Elsevier B.V
01.07.2023
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| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISSN | 0014-2921 1873-572X |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104466 |
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| Abstract | A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need for voluntary collective action remains, however, because binding the state to citizen's interests requires the latter's civic engagement. As a public good in its own right, economic theory expects civic engagement to be underprovided. We conduct the first laboratory experiment in which participants can create a socially efficient central sanctioning scheme (representing the accountable state) through a prior stage of voluntary costly actions that are theoretically ruled out for strictly self-interested agents—a social dilemma. Our experimental subjects sustain civic engagement when its cost is modest, suggesting sustainable cooperation in linked social dilemmas perhaps due to a cost-benefit calculus we call “leverage.” |
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| AbstractList | A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need for voluntary collective action remains, however, because binding the state to citizen's interests requires the latter's civic engagement. As a public good in its own right, economic theory expects civic engagement to be underprovided. We conduct the first laboratory experiment in which participants can create a socially efficient central sanctioning scheme (representing the accountable state) through a prior stage of voluntary costly actions that are theoretically ruled out for strictly self-interested agents—a social dilemma. Our experimental subjects sustain civic engagement when its cost is modest, suggesting sustainable cooperation in linked social dilemmas perhaps due to a cost-benefit calculus we call “leverage.” |
| ArticleNumber | 104466 |
| Author | Kamei, Kenju Tyran, Jean-Robert Putterman, Louis |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Kenju surname: Kamei fullname: Kamei, Kenju organization: Faculty of Economics, Keio University – sequence: 2 givenname: Louis orcidid: 0000-0001-7825-2791 surname: Putterman fullname: Putterman, Louis email: Louis_Putterman@brown.edu organization: Department of Economics, Box B, Brown University, Providence, RI, 02912, United States – sequence: 3 givenname: Jean-Robert surname: Tyran fullname: Tyran, Jean-Robert organization: Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Austria, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, and Department of Economics, University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia |
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| Keywords | Punishment H41 Experiment Cooperation D02 Public goods provision Civic engagement C92 D72 |
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