Civic engagement, the leverage effect and the accountable state

• Published in: European economic review Vol. 156; p. 104466
• Main Authors: Kamei, Kenju, Putterman, Louis, Tyran, Jean-Robert
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.07.2023
• Subjects: Civic engagement; Cooperation; Experiment; Public goods provision; Punishment; Punishment; H41; Experiment; Cooperation; D02; Public goods provision; Civic engagement; C92; D72
• ISSN: 0014-2921; 1873-572X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104466

A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need for voluntary collective action remains, however, because binding the state to citizen's interests requires the latter's civic engagement. As a public good in its own right, economic theory expects civic engagement to be underprovided. We conduct the first laboratory experiment in which participants can create a socially efficient central sanctioning scheme (representing the accountable state) through a prior stage of voluntary costly actions that are theoretically ruled out for strictly self-interested agents—a social dilemma. Our experimental subjects sustain civic engagement when its cost is modest, suggesting sustainable cooperation in linked social dilemmas perhaps due to a cost-benefit calculus we call “leverage.”