The Proper Work of the Intellect

There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. There is also a widespread platitude to the effect that this is at heart two distinct goals in te...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 5; no. 1; pp. 22 - 40
Main Author TREANOR, NICK
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.03.2019
Subjects
Epistemology
Knowledge
Norms
Teleology
veritism
virtue epistemology
epistemic normativity
truth consequentialism
epistemic value
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ISSN2053-4477
2053-4485
DOI10.1017/apa.2018.42

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Summary:There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. There is also a widespread platitude to the effect that this is at heart two distinct goals in tension with one another. The teleological picture faces numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting is an argument that rests on this platitude. This paper looks more closely at the standard way of understanding the truth goal, drawing out its explicit and implicit features. The aim will be to show that the standard way the truth goal is understood is deeply mistaken, to propose and defend an alternative model, and to show how this alternative model restores the unity of the goal and its potential to ground and explain the normative dimensions of belief.
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ISSN:2053-4477
2053-4485
DOI:10.1017/apa.2018.42