Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites

• Published in: Philosophical explorations Vol. 28; no. 1; pp. 51 - 67
• Main Authors: Ivanov, Ivan V., Schipper, Arthur
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Abingdon Routledge 02.01.2025; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: debunking arguments; intentionalism; naïve realism; Ordinary objects; perceptual metaphysics; Phenomenology; restricted composition
• ISSN: 1386-9795; 1741-5918
• DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2419652

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness.