The norm of reasoning

The paper presents and defends a new account of reasoning. Reasoning is essentially subject to a constitutive norm, the norm of following sufficient normative reasons. Instead of rule-following, following normative reasons is essential. After clarifying the view, three arguments in its support will...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical explorations Vol. 28; no. 1; pp. 14 - 31
Main Author Hofmann, Frank
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 02.01.2025
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
basing
inference
justification
norms
Reasoning
reasons
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1386-9795
1741-5918
DOI10.1080/13869795.2024.2400343

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Summary:The paper presents and defends a new account of reasoning. Reasoning is essentially subject to a constitutive norm, the norm of following sufficient normative reasons. Instead of rule-following, following normative reasons is essential. After clarifying the view, three arguments in its support will be presented. They concern the scope of (correct) reasoning, the value of (correct) reasoning, and the relation between reasoning and treating a consideration as a reason. Two objections - concerning the knowledge norm of belief and cases of improperly treating a consideration as a reason - will be dealt with.
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content type line 14
ISSN:1386-9795
1741-5918
DOI:10.1080/13869795.2024.2400343