Frontline workers' performance in prosocial tasks: evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field in Western India

• Published in: The International journal of public sector management Vol. 36; no. 6/7; pp. 546 - 562
• Main Authors: Srinivasan, Shuchi, Sarin, Ankur
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Bradford Emerald Publishing Limited 05.12.2023; Emerald Group Publishing Limited
• Subjects: Beneficiaries; Compensation; Experiments; Incentives; Monetary incentives; Motivation; Nutrition; Pay for performance; Performance related pay; Policy implementation; Prosocial behavior; Public goods; Self interest; Task performance; Wages & salaries; Workers; India; Public programs; Frontline workers; Incentives; Lab-in-the-field; Prosocial
• ISSN: 0951-3558; 1758-6666
• DOI: 10.1108/IJPSM-01-2023-0027

PurposeFrontline workers (FLWs) constitute a critical part of the implementation cadre within public policies, serving a significant role in the last-mile delivery of public goods and services. FLWs under public programs in low and middle-income countries like India are offered different compensation structures that range from full-time salaries, piece rate honorariums, contractual engagements, to no remuneration. Whilst the rationale for offering different compensations vary, are certain structures more successful in encouraging FLWs to perform a prosocial task? Further, can certain structures encourage FLWs to perform beyond the incentivized policy mandate?Design/methodology/approachInvestigating workers' prosocial effort within policy implementation, the authors conducted a randomized lab-in-the-field inquiry with 344 Anganwadi-based workers (workers under the nutrition policy) in western India. These FLWs were engaged to perform a novel real-effort task that was tied to different incentive structures and their performance was adjudged based on measurable quantity, effort and quality parameters.FindingsResults demonstrate that uncompensated workers invest the greatest amount of effort whilst compromising on task quality, and vice-versa for subjects receiving pay-for-performance compensation. Programs must account for policy focus when offering compensations: volunteer engagement may be counterproductive for quality focus and to the adherence to ancillary task mandates like nature/quality of beneficiary interaction. On the other hand, the distribution of products (like health goods) can rely on volunteer effort.Originality/valueThe study brings together various compensation schemes operating at the field level, under one study using an LFE methodology within the context of policy implementation in India.