Being Open-Minded about Open-Mindedness

• Published in: Philosophy (London) Vol. 99; no. 2; pp. 191 - 221
• Main Author: Khorasanee, Kasim
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.04.2024
• Subjects: Attitudes; Belief & doubt; Epistemology; Evidentiality; Objectivity
• ISSN: 0031-8191; 1469-817X
• DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000396

Within the field of virtue and vice epistemology open-mindedness is usually considered an archetypal virtue. Nevertheless, there is ongoing disagreement over how exactly it should be defined. In this paper I propose a novel definition of open-mindedness as a process of impartial belief revision and use it to argue that we should shift our normative assessments away from the trait itself to the context in which it is exercised. My definition works by three sequential stages: not screening new claims, impartially weighing the evidential strength of claims, and updating beliefs accordingly. Using this definition I argue for a focus on agents’ particular circumstances to determine what degrees of credulity, open-, or closed-mindedness are appropriate in any given situation. As well as providing conceptual clarity regarding the concept of open-mindedness this paper indicates the benefits of this contextual approach for our everyday epistemic attitudes. In particular it enables us to recognise, without stigma, when ourselves or others deviate from open-mindedness for appropriate reasons.