Absence and Abnormality
Absences pose a dilemma for theories of causation. Allowing them to be causes seems to make theories too permissive. Banning them from being causes seems to make theories too restrictive. An increasingly popular approach to this dilemma is to acknowledge that norms can affect which absences count as...
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Published in | Analysis (Oxford) Vol. 83; no. 1; pp. 98 - 106 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
11.08.2023
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0003-2638 1467-8284 1467-8284 |
DOI | 10.1093/analys/anac030 |
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Summary: | Absences pose a dilemma for theories of causation. Allowing them to be causes seems to make theories too permissive. Banning them from being causes seems to make theories too restrictive. An increasingly popular approach to this dilemma is to acknowledge that norms can affect which absences count as causes. In this article, I distinguish between two influential implementations of such ‘abnormality’ approaches and argue that so-called ‘double-prevention mechanisms’ provide counterexamples against both. |
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ISSN: | 0003-2638 1467-8284 1467-8284 |
DOI: | 10.1093/analys/anac030 |