Epistemic logic with partial grasp

We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject...

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Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 204; no. 3; p. 92
Main Author Silva, Francisca
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 29.08.2024
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Original Research
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Aboutness
Immanent closure
Epistemic logic
First order
Subject matter
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ISSN1573-0964
0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1

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Summary:We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this, I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind considerations from first-order aboutness theory with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure (Yablo Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014).
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ISSN:1573-0964
0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1