Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization

We study original position arguments in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general formal framework for such arguments. Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social choice rules that can be supported by original position arguments. We illustrate this charac...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics and philosophy Vol. 41; no. 2; pp. 395 - 426
Main Authors De Coninck, Thijs, Van De Putte, Frederik
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.07.2025
Subjects
axiomatization
Original position arguments
social choice under ignorance
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ISSN0266-2671
1474-0028
DOI10.1017/S0266267124000270

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Summary:We study original position arguments in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general formal framework for such arguments. Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social choice rules that can be supported by original position arguments. We illustrate this characterization in terms of various well-known social choice rules, some of which do and some of which do not satisfy the axioms in question. Depending on the perspective one takes, our results can be used to argue against certain rules, against Rawlsian theories of procedural fairness, or in support of richer, multidimensional models of individual choice.
ISSN:0266-2671
1474-0028
DOI:10.1017/S0266267124000270