Disclosure in corporate pension plans using a regression discontinuity design

• Published in: The Quarterly review of economics and finance Vol. 99; p. 101936
• Main Author: Lim, Yuree
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.01.2025
• Subjects: Corporate pensions; Disclosure; Regression discontinuity; Corporate pensions; G23; Regression discontinuity; Disclosure; G11; G32
• ISSN: 1062-9769
• DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2024.101936

Disclosure affects corporate pension plans’ shrouded fees. Using a 2009 disclosure regulation of pension service providers’ fees and a regression discontinuity (RD) design, we show that pension plans subject to the disclosure requirement are more likely to report increased total administrative fees. The source of these increased fees is an increase in investment advisory and management fees. Our results are robust to various identification tests. Our evidence suggests sizable shrouded fees of approximately $27 per participant in a corporate pension plan. •RD design shows 2009 disclosure regulation increases reported administrative fees.•Increased fees primarily stem from higher investment advisory and management fees.•Evidence suggests shrouded fees of approximately $27 per participant.•Findings highlight the impact of transparency on fee structures in corporate pensions.