Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction, truncation, and conversion

In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy‐trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of behavioral decision making Vol. 4; no. 4; pp. 249 - 262
Main Authors Reyna, Valerie F., Brainerd, Charles J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chichester John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 01.10.1991
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ISSN0894-3257
1099-0771
DOI10.1002/bdm.3960040403

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Summary:In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy‐trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy‐processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed‐frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision information.
Bibliography:istex:7083945B455C650D85DE516942CE848877AB2B1D
ArticleID:BDM3960040403
ark:/67375/WNG-JK3B8BSM-C
Charles J. Brainerd is Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Arizona. A Michigan State University PhD, his current research focuses on developmental processes in memory and cognition, and on mathematical modeling.
Valerie F. Reyna is Assistant Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Arizona. A Rockefeller. University PhD, her current research focuses on reasoning, decision making, and their development.
ISSN:0894-3257
1099-0771
DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040403