Statistical Privacy-Preserving Online Distributed Nash Equilibrium Tracking in Aggregative Games

This article considers an online aggregative game equilibrium problem subject to privacy preservation, where all players aim at tracking the time-varying Nash equilibrium, while some players are corrupted by an adversary. We propose a distributed online Nash equilibrium tracking algorithm, where a c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIEEE transactions on automatic control Vol. 69; no. 1; pp. 323 - 330
Main Authors Lin, Yeming, Liu, Kun, Han, Dongyu, Xia, Yuanqing
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York IEEE 01.01.2024
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
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ISSN0018-9286
1558-2523
DOI10.1109/TAC.2023.3264164

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Summary:This article considers an online aggregative game equilibrium problem subject to privacy preservation, where all players aim at tracking the time-varying Nash equilibrium, while some players are corrupted by an adversary. We propose a distributed online Nash equilibrium tracking algorithm, where a correlated perturbation mechanism is employed to mask the local information of the players. Our theoretical analysis shows that the proposed algorithm can achieve a sublinear expected regret bound while preserving the privacy of uncorrupted players. We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence to analyze the privacy bound in a statistical sense. Furthermore, we present a tradeoff between the expected regret and the statistical privacy, to obtain a constant privacy bound when the regret bound is sublinear.
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ISSN:0018-9286
1558-2523
DOI:10.1109/TAC.2023.3264164