Against causal arguments in metaphysics

• Published in: Asian journal of philosophy Vol. 3; no. 2
• Main Author: Vaassen, Bram
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 02.09.2024
• Subjects: Analytic Philosophy; Article Symposium; Causal arguments; Dualism; Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Exclusion arguments; Lei Zhong; Mental causation; Philosophy; Physicalism; Exclusion arguments; Physicalism; Causal arguments; Mental causation; Lei Zhong; Dualism
• ISSN: 2731-4642; 2731-4642
• DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00184-5

Traditionally, causal arguments for physicalism have been taken to favour a ‘reductive’ brand of physicalism, according to which all the mental stuff is identical to some of the physical stuff. Many flaws have been found with these traditional causal arguments. Zhong ( Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (2), 1–9, 2023 ) develops a new causal argument that avoids these flaws and favours a milder, non-reductive brand of physicalism instead. The conclusion is that all mental stuff is metaphysically necessitated by some of the physical stuff. I argue that neither the traditional nor the new causal argument holds much sway over non-physicalism. The problem is that causation just does not run that deep. It is a fairly superficial relationship and a poor guide to the metaphysically weighty facts of our world, such as what is identical to what, and what metaphysically necessitates what.