Legal Arguments from Scholarly Authority

Ordinary arguments from authority have the following structure: A says p; A is authoritative on such things; so p. Legal actors use such arguments whenever they ground their decisions on the sheer “say‐so” of legislators, judges, scholars, expert witnesses, and so on. This paper focuses on arguments...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inRatio juris Vol. 30; no. 3; pp. 305 - 321
Main Author Shecaira, Fábio Perin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01.09.2017
Subjects
Legal arguments
Scholars
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0952-1917
1467-9337
DOI10.1111/raju.12164

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Summary:Ordinary arguments from authority have the following structure: A says p; A is authoritative on such things; so p. Legal actors use such arguments whenever they ground their decisions on the sheer “say‐so” of legislators, judges, scholars, expert witnesses, and so on. This paper focuses on arguments appealing to the authority of scholars, “doctrinal” or “dogmatic” legal scholars in particular. Appeal to doctrinal authority is a puzzling feature of legal argumentation. In what sense are doctrinal scholars “authorities”? Is p, as advanced by a scholar, descriptive or prescriptive? Is scholarly authority grounded on expertise or something different? The paper addresses these questions.
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ISSN:0952-1917
1467-9337
DOI:10.1111/raju.12164